Russian Mobilization and the Eurasian Alliance
Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and the Russo-Sino Alliance
Last week, Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Samarkand, Uzbekistan. The meeting took place at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit, an annual conference for heads of state for the Eurasian political, economic, and security organization. According to an entry on Wikipedia, the SCO is the world’s largest regional organization. Both China and Russia are members of the SCO.
As we’ve long suspected here at Muzzle Velocity, Russia and China are allies, with Russia as the junior partner in this alliance. During the course of the Russo-Ukraine War thus far, we’ve seen China increase the amount of financial and material support to Russia. While the sanctions have thus far strengthened Russia’s financial position, the effects are slowly taking hold; namely, Russia’s ability to procure necessary materials to maintain an adequate logistics train to project power across its borders. While Russia remains militarily formidable, the stress shows as Ukraine pushes back Russian territorial advances in a repeat of the defeated drive to Kyiv (Kiev).
The Russo-Ukraine War goes poorly for Russia. Russian military planners expected to steamroll Ukrainian defenders early in the war and attempted a few “thunder-runs” to take the Ukrainian capital. After that failure, Russian forces reconsolidated in the East and began a rolling bombardment and rolling offensive against the Eastern Ukrainian positions. Ukrainian defenders, the deluge of weapons, and Western intelligence support blunted the attacks. Recently, Russia again pulled back further East in the face of localized Ukrainian offensives that retook several key areas.
Ukraine is very important geopolitically. Russia’s interests extend to its trade value in agricultural products, its significance in European energy, and the fact that its immediate neighbor is increasingly integrating into the European Union. China’s interests overlap with Russia for very key, critical reasons. One of China's most significant problems is its need for calories. China has over 1.4 billion people, and the raw tonnage of food the country consumes alone causes severe ecological stress. While Russia is already a grain exporter, control of more would allow China to more sustainably feeds its population. It also denies the critical American allies in the region access to food from Ukraine, thus advancing China’s interests in Africa. While Russia’s and China’s interests are somewhat contradictory, with Russia’s interest in suppressing the supply of important exports, China’s supremacy and needs supersede.
China directly benefits from the war itself as well. American sanctions on Iran mean that the oil-rich Persian country exports a significant amount of oil to China, possibly a quarter or more of Iranian oil production. Russian oil and gas, sanctioned by the broader Western powers, now mean that higher-quality Russia pumps its fuel exports at a discounted price to China.
In another article, I will explore the consequences of the Russo-Ukraine war, but China also benefits from the weakening of Russia. A weaker Russia means a more pliable Russia, which will be under Beijing's further control. One of the Cold War's major misunderstandings was the Sino-Soviet split and its extent, which was likely temporary at best. There’s a video of a younger Senator Joe Biden discussing how much a disaster invading Ukraine would be for Russia. He failed to understand that the current Russian leadership’s avarice exceeds its patriotism. The coming carving of Russia will rival the post-revolutionary period.
Russia's geopolitical sphere will become China’s without a radical policy change. Many of the paid and unpaid speakers of the Russo-Sino Eurasianism project discuss the concept of a geopolitical integration of the polities to form a singular global power. The concept is called the Heartland Theory by author Halford John Mackinder in 1904. As a concept, it predicted many of the moves by the various alliances from the 1905 Russo-Japanese War to the entangling alliances before the Second World War era. The major Allied concern, for example, was a Russo-German alliance combining forces with the ascending Japanese Empire. This was a major factor for decision-making in the post-war period by all major powers as well. More contemporary thinkers on this subject include Kissinger and Brzezinski.
Technological and economic were major reasons for the failures of previous attempts at a central heartland Eurasian power. The raw lack of development, inability to traverse the Asian continent easily, the difficulty in feeding people, disease, and overall poverty in the past prevented this from occurring. With modern advancements, this has become less of an issue as well as a declining power in Russia and an ascendant one in China.
The consequence of the meeting is already unfolding; Russia has declared a partial mobilization of its citizens after basically asking permission from China in Samarkand. Will we see Chinese forces in Ukraine? I do not believe it is likely at this stage. However, the world sees the first major pushing match between the rival power blocks. The war for the world’s future has begun.
(image from https://www.reddit.com/r/HOI4memes/comments/xk0z8s/putin_now_in_partial_mob/)
Good piece as always.