39 Seconds to Shoot Down A Missile

Why that's not enough time to shoot down a Russian cruise missile over Poland

On Sunday, March 24, Russian cruise missiles crossed over Polish territory on their way to strike targets in Ukraine. The resulting launches and strikes caused a cacophony of complaints across Twitter (X) that Poland, in particular, but NATO in general, must do more to protect Ukraine from missile strikes that cross NATO territory. However, that proposition is far from realistic.

The Situation

https://twitter.com/sentdefender/status/1771772065479078076

The Russian cruise missile crossed over the Eastern Polish border with Ukraine, around the village of Oserdow, Poland, about 40 miles/65 kilometers North of Lviv, Ukraine. Oserdow, Poland, is right up against the Polish-Ukrainian border.

The cruise missile crossed into Polish territory, presumably from the Ukrainian side (The Polish-Belorussian border is more than 80 miles from the village). It performed one or more loops before turning into Ukrainian territory to its final destination.

It might sound fanciful that a cruise missile may have done a U-Turn or laps while waiting to strike a target. A defining feature of cruise missiles is that they are self-navigating, and some can receive orders midflight or be instructed to stand off outside of air defense range and then come in on a follow-up attack wave. The public isn’t likely to know what the mission set was for this missile. It’s possible that it was instructed to loiter on the Polish-Ukrainian border, or that it was lost and had to redirect itself towards its target, or that it was lost and instructed back on the correct flight path.

39 Seconds to Acquire, Decide, and Kill the Bandit

One of the critical facts to focus on is the 39 seconds that the cruise missile was in Polish territory. NATO air defense radars, both on the ground and in the air, constantly monitor Russian/Belorussian activity and the airspace in Ukraine. Practically, that’s a lot of known and unknown objects moving at any given time. Especially given that Ukraine is an active warzone, there are a lot of bogeys or unknown aircraft to track at any given time. While when Russia launches a barrage of cruise missiles, it looks like a cruise missile attack at the point of origin, between their self-navigation and often low altitude flight paths, radar systems lose these targets at an extreme distance.

Target Acquisition

So, let’s take this scenario: NATO air defense radar picks up a bogey in the vicinity of the Polish-Ukraine border, flying at a steady rate of speed, about to cross into Polish territory from (some unknown angle) Ukraine. What does that mean? Absolutely nothing at that point. NATO air defense does not yet know what that unidentified flying object is. Remember, NATO and Poland are not in a state of war and are at peace with Russia currently, though they are supporting Ukraine with arms and aid.

At this point, NATO forces must identify the object. Positive Identification (PID) involves using Rules of Engagement (ROE) and one’s personal, trained judgment to determine if the subject in question is hostile. Their hostile intent or hostile action defines a valid target. While hostile acts may allow for force used in self-defense, hostile intent does not necessarily mean that weapons go hot. The Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) dictates that there must be military necessity, a distinction between belligerents and civilians, and proportionality in the legal use of force.

Radar and electronic signatures help determine the object, flight patterns, and trajectory. Still, because it is a peacetime situation, ROE likely dictates there must be visual identification.

For example, when an aircraft crosses into a no-fly zone in the United States, air traffic control and air defenses challenge it over the radio. Then, the military scrambles an aircraft to visually inspect the plane and attempt to warn the unidentified aircraft away.

So, while the object is being identified, radio operators might engage the object on the radio depending on ROE and expected flights around the Polish/Ukrainian border. At the same time, ground spotters attempt to acquire the bogey visually. The cruise missile won’t talk back.

This process can take seconds or minutes. Remember, there’s a 39-second engagement window.

Rules of Engagement and Engagement Authorization

Presuming that the object is positively identified as a Russian cruise missile and is about to cross into Polish airspace, the next question becomes whether to engage or not and whether we have the means to engage or not.

So we’re back in the position of an air defense battery commander or an airspace battle captain. Your team has positively identified a Russian cruise missile that’s seconds from entering Polish airspace. You only see one cruise missile about to enter the airspace? What do you do? Can you engage? It’s a cruise missile, so it has hostile intent by definition but hasn’t caused a hostile action.

Meanwhile, you know that NATO is not at war with Russia, and your actions could accidentally trigger Article 5 and a global conflict. What do you do? Your ROE and good judgment tell you to call up your higher headquarters. Another few seconds pass by.

Your immediate superior probably cannot authorize weapons to go hot. The highest levels probably retain the sole authorization for using force that is not in self-defense. The President of Poland, the Prime Minister of Poland, and their national security staff probably would hear of this first, followed by Supreme Allied Command, Europe (SACEUR) and US Forces Europe. It would likely be a Polish decision to engage the target. This decision would require gathering important players in consultation with key allies. Now, this would take several minutes.

Already, we are beyond the 39 seconds that the Russian cruise missile took to enter and leave Polish Air Space.

Interdiction

You need another missile or an anti-aircraft gun to take down a cruise missile. Land-based surface-to-air missiles (SAM) like the Patriot or THAAD are well suited to this mission, but ideally, a fighter aircraft firing an air-to-air missile. Here lies another issue – engagement distance and time-to-target. An AIM-120 AMRAAM missile has a range of 105km to 160km, depending on the variant. Fighter aircraft on combat air patrol should be well within sovereign airspace, prepared to engage a target at maximum standoff distance to maximize survivability. At Mach 4, or 1,372 meters per second, that missile would take more than a minute to strike its target at 100km standoff, meaning the missile would likely impact over Ukraine airspace in this scenario.

Technical and Tactical Conclusion

Given Rules of Engagement during a peacetime footing, available weapons platforms, and the limited time in Polish Airspace, it was practically impossible for Polish or NATO air defenses to intercept the missile in 39 seconds.

NATO Strategic Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

NATO or Poland are not currently in a state of war, and the Russian cruise missile, while violating Polish air space, did not necessitate a hostile intention towards Poland or NATO. Under the best possible circumstances, Poland and NATO handled the dilemma appropriately.

I recommend that Polish and NATO policymakers examine the rules of engagement and ensure that the process is maximally streamlined in case of any Russian attack using air or missile assets.

Why I had to write this

The amount of vitriol by some Ukrainian pundits and the Twitter commentariat is inappropriate, grotesque, and completely unrealistic. See examples:

https://x.com/dszeligowski/status/1771911642231537867

https://twitter.com/VladNed/status/1771143290265510099

The first rule in the online communications battle is not to harm one’s most important allies’ relationship with you. This principle is especially true for Ukraine, where single individuals in prominent positions have significantly damaged the war effort with outbursts and lapses of judgment. Ukraine and Poland must be on good terms with one another.

There is a fringe minority in Ukraine whose politics center around anti-Polish sentiment. For someone with a Polish surname, I do not know where it comes from or why it still exists. It is intensely inappropriate, especially given all that the Polish people have done so far for Ukrainians.

Ukrainian decision-makers have much to learn about how the West perceives diplomatic errors and bad optics. Do not let the loudest voices with Ukrainian flags in bio bully.

I encourage everyone to push back hard against people who are attempting to do damage to the war effort by tweeting their most bigoted attitudes towards the partner nations.

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